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EPR-Bell realism as a part of logic
I. Schmelzer
We argue that for the proof of Bell’s theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are
necessary. The key formula
E(AB|a, b) =
∫
A(a, b, λ)B(a, b, λ)ρ(λ)dλ
follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability
theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space Λ, usually inter-
preted as some space of “hidden variables”, can be constructed for an arbitrary “field of discourse”
using Stone’s theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence – the
non-existence of information which suggest a dependence – of the free decisions of the experimenters
from everything else.
To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to
E(AB|a, b) =
∫
A(a, λ)B(b, λ)ρ(λ)dλ.
This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the conse-
quence of the violation of Bell’s inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified,
without any loopholes left.
We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to
create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak
(signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human
inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for
fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or
requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible
with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is a lot of discussion about the assump-
tions necessary to prove the Bell inequalities, there is a
wide agreement that one needs, beyond Einstein causal-
ity (usually named “locality”1), some other non-trivial
physical assumptions. Variants of proofs of Bell’s in-
equality may use different assumptions, in particular
“realism” (however specified), “counter-factual definite-
ness”, or Reichenbach’s principle of common cause [15].
Moreover, one also has to exclude superdeterminism.
The main thesis of this paper is that there is no need
for any physical assumptions beyond Einstein causality.
All what is necessary beyond Einstein causality is, in fact,
already part of logic – of the logic of plausible reasoning,
usually named “objective Bayesian interpretation” of the
rules of probability theory, as defined by Cox [1] and
Jaynes [8]. The straightforward consequence is that, once
the violation of Bell’s inequalities for space-like separated
measurements is accepted, Einstein causality has to be
given up, as falsified by these experiments.
1 We will not use “locality” because it is misleading. One can
easily imagine theories with a preferred frame which are local
in the common sense meaning, but with a maximal speed of
information transfer greater than the speed of light. Despite
being local in any reasonable sense, they would have to be named
“nonlocal” if “local” is used for Einstein causality.
Beyond this main result, we discuss possible loopholes
and consequences.
There is no way to avoid this conclusion beyond the
questioning of logic, even if not of classical logic, but
only in the less well-studied form of the logic of plausi-
ble reasoning. Given that defenders of Einstein causality
have been ready to reject even such fundamental things
as realism (as defined by the EPR criterion of reality)
as well as classical causality (in any version containing
Reichenbach’s principle of common cause), one can ex-
pect that at least some physicists will consider even the
rejection of logic as a reasonable alternative. Once there
can be, even in principle, no logical arguments against
the rejection of logic, we cannot prove they are wrong,
so that we simply have to accept this possibility as a fact
of life. Nonetheless, we give a short overview of previous
attempts to question logic, because, even if they have
failed to question logic itself, they were not completely
worthless but have reached something, namely a better
understanding of logic. Our suggestion is that question-
ing the logic of plausible reasoning has a chance to reach
similar results too – but that would not change the main
result of this paper. It would leave the mathematics of
the proof, and therefore the necessity to reject Einstein
causality, unchanged. What one can reasonably hope for
is a reinterpretation of these mathematics in common lan-
guage, avoiding misinterpretations caused by the vague-
ness of human language, which we, as human beings, use
to describe even precise mathematical results.
2For those who do not want to question the logic of plau-
sible reasoning, the rejection of Einstein causality is un-
avoidable. What follows from this? The straightforward
alternative would be the revival of a preferred frame,
which would allow hidden quantum causal information
transfer from past into future in some hidden absolute
time coordinate. While this would be in contradiction
with the standard interpretation of SR as well as GR, it
would not be in conflict with observation. Indeed, in SR
the Lorentz ether is simply an interpretation, even the
original one. Moreover, viable alternatives with a pre-
ferred frame have been proposed for modern physics too,
as for gravity [14], as for the standard model of particle
physics [13]. Thus, to accept a hidden preferred frame is
at least not as problematic as usually assumed.
Another alternative would be weakening causality, so
that one can nonetheless preserve Einstein causality, even
if only in a weaker sense. Here, we have a straightforward
candidate worth to be discussed, namely weak or signal
causality. Weak or signal Einstein causality could be vio-
lated only with a real transfer of information faster than
light. Given the theorem that such information transfer
is not possible using violations of the Bell inequalities, it
seems reasonable to hope that this weaker notion could
be preserved. And we, indeed, will not question this the-
orem, so, will not question signal Einstein causality. In
this sense, it remains a way to preserve Einstein causality.
Nonetheless, signal causality has no chance to have any
fundamental relevance. Given the formulas which follow
from the logic alone, there appears to be only one expla-
nation why signal causality appears to be weaker than
strong causality, namely that we are unable to prepare
sufficiently localized states. If we would be able to pre-
pare states with all really existing parameters fixed, we
could send signals, but all what we can prepare are av-
erages, quantum equilibrium states, and in these states
all the information we would like to send is averaged out.
So, it is the most trivial, straightforward excuse for our
inability to send faster than light signals which appears
to be sufficient.
II. WHAT WE NEED TO PROVE BELL’S
INEQUALITY
In the large amount of discussion following Bell’s the-
orem, there has been no doubt (beyond the fringes) that
Bell’s inequality follows from eq. (2) of Bell’s paper,
which can be rewritten as the formula for the expectation
value of the product AB of the measurement results:
E(AB|a, b) =
∫
A(a, λ)B(b, λ)ρ(λ)dλ. (1)
The part where Einstein causality is used can be also
easily identified. If we can derive the formula
E(AB|a, b) =
∫
λ∈Λ
A(a, b, λ)B(a, b, λ)ρ(λ)dλ, (2)
then we can derive (1) using Einstein causality, because
Einstein causality tells us that the measurement result of
Alice A(a, b, λ) cannot depend on the decision b of Bob
what to measure, resp. for the measurement result of
Bob B(a, b, λ) depending on the decision a of Alice. So,
the question what we need beyond Einstein causality to
derive Bell’s inequality reduces to the question what we
need to derive (2). Now, (2) is nothing but an application
of the more general formula
E(o|a) =
∫
o(a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ, (3)
where a ∈ A denotes all decisions of experimenters,
and o(a, λ) denotes some observable which is measured.
What do we need to derive this formula?
The straightforward way to derive it, which we will use
here, is to obtain a general formula for the expectation
values in Kolmogorovian probability theory, namely
E(f) =
∫
ω∈Ω
f(ω)ρ(ω)dω. (4)
Then we apply this formula to the general experimental
situation where we distinguish between the parameters
a ∈ A which can be freely chosen by the experimenters,
and all the other parameters λ ∈ Λ, so that instead of
a general ω we consider now pairs ω = (a, λ) ∈ A × Λ.
This would give
E(f) =
∫
f(a, λ)ρ(a, λ)dadλ. (5)
What remains is to get rid of the dependence of ρ(a, λ)
on a. That means, the free decisions of the experimenters
should be independent of everything what defines the
state of the system which is measured. This would give
E(f) =
∫
f(a, λ)ρ(a)ρ(λ)dadλ (6)
and as a consequence (3). This step is the rejection of
superdeterminism.
So, what we have to do is to obtain formula (4) of
Kolmogorovian probability theory, and to justify the re-
jection of superdeterminism.
III. KOLMOGOROVIAN PROBABILITY
THEORY AS THE LOGIC OF PLAUSIBLE
REASONING
To justify the application of formulas of probability
theory based on logic alone, we have to switch from the
frequency interpretation of probability to the Bayesian
interpretation of probability in its objective variant, as
proposed by Cox [1] and Jaynes [8]. If we interpret (4)
as a formula of the frequency interpretation, we have no
chance to derive it out of nothing but logic. Indeed, in
the frequency interpretation any statements about prob-
abilities are physical hypotheses about some frequencies,
3which, as any other empirical hypotheses, may be falsi-
fied by observation. Instead, in the objective Bayesian
interpretation, the probabilities are degrees of plausibil-
ity of a statement given all the available information.
These degrees of plausibility have to follow logical rules
of consistency. It appears that these rules of consistency,
combined with a few simple conventions, are equivalent
to the rules of probability theory.
Unfortunately, the rules derived by Cox [1] and Jaynes
[8] for the logic of plausible reasoning do not cover all
formulas of Kolmogorovian probability theory. What
Jaynes [8] writes about differences between Kolmogoro-
vian probability theory and the logic of plausible reason-
ing is not encouraging:
Our system of probability, however, differs
conceptually from that of Kolmogorov in that
we do not interpret propositions in terms of
sets, but we do interpret probability distribu-
tions as carriers of incomplete information.
[8] p.50
The Kolmogorov system of probability
(henceforth denoted by KSP) is a game
played on a sample space Ω of elementary
propositions ωi (or ‘events’; it does not mat-
ter what we call them at this level of abstrac-
tion). . . . For all practical purposes, then, our
system will agree with KSP if we are apply-
ing it in the set-theory context. But in more
general applications, although we have a field
of discourse F and probability measure P on
F with the same properties, we do not need,
and do not always have, any set Ω of elemen-
tary propositions into which the elements of
F can be resolved. [8] p.651ff
Fortunately, it appears that the set Ω can be con-
structed, always. Let’s see. What is considered in the
logic of plausible reasoning is a “field of discourse” F ,
which is the set of all propositions considered. It is an
abstract Boolean algebra, that means, we can apply the
Boolean operations ∧,∨,¬ and they follow the rules of
classical logic. Instead, Kolmogorovian probability con-
siders only a special realization of a Boolean algebra,
namely of the algebra of subsets of a set Ω, with the set-
theoretic operations ∩,∪, ¯ of intersection, union and
complement.
This leads to the natural question if there are abstract
Boolean algebras which cannot be represented by the al-
gebra of subsets of some space. The answer is given by
Stone’s representation theorem for Boolean algebras [16].
It tells that every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to an al-
gebra of subsets of some set Ω, its Stone space. The Stone
space of a Boolean algebra is the set of homomorphisms
of the algebra to the two-element Boolean algebra {0, 1}.
That means, each ω ∈ Ω defines for each A ∈ F a truth
value A(ω) ∈ {0, 1}. Every proposition A ∈ F is the
equivalent to the subset A ⊂ Ω of propositions which are
true for A, by {ω ∈ Ω|A(ω) = 1}. These subsets can be
used to define a topology as well as the corresponding
Borel algebra, so that every A appears to be measurable.
Let’s note here that the Stone space is a completely
natural thing from point of view of plausible reasoning.
An element of the Stone space ω ∈ Ω fixes a truth value
for every proposition, and, as a homomorphisms, does
this in a consistent way, so that if A and B are assumed
to be true, then A ∧B also has to be true. So, it is sim-
ply what one could describe as a consistent, conceivable,
imaginable possibility, eventuality, story or scenario. So,
the space Ω is a quite natural object, constructed in a
straightforward way out of what is open and well-known,
the set of consistent scenarios.
This changes the interpretation of the space Λ, as we
know it from usual discussions of Bell’s theorem, where
it considered to be a space of “hidden parameters”. The
space Ω ∼= A×Λ is, instead, constructed out of elements
which are completely well-known – the propositions of
the field of discourse F which is considered. Ok, the par-
ticular truth values fixed by the particular ω ∈ Ω may
remain hidden from observation, so in this sense the ω
contains some hidden parameters. But the meaning of
the particular parameter is well-defined and part of what
is considered, and it is only the particular value which
remains hidden. This completely contradicts the usual
perceptions about hidden variables: The construction of
the space of “hidden variables” is a trivial, straightfor-
ward operation, given the set of statements under con-
sideration.
Moreover, it also changes the interpretation of the role
of random variables – in particular of all observables –
being well-defined functions of ω. One can naively think
that behind this is hidden an assumption about determin-
ism. It is not – a random variable f may be as fundamen-
tally, inherently random as one likes, the proposition “f
has the value f0” will be a valid proposition of our field
of discourse, and therefore it is, for every ω ∈ Ω, either
true or false, and in any case well-defined and fixed for
this particular ω.
IV. WHY LOGICAL INDEPENDENCE IS
SUFFICIENT TO IGNORE
SUPERDETERMINISM
An important difference between the frequency inter-
pretation of probability and the logic of plausible reason-
ing is the very different notion of independence. In the
frequency interpretation, independence is a very nontriv-
ial physical hypothesis – the null hypothesis. It may ap-
pear false – falsified by observation, which shows a cor-
relation. The situation appears completely different in
plausible reasoning. Here, the question is a completely
different one – what would be rational to think, given the
available information? In a situation where we have no
information which indicates any connection, it would be
irrational to assume there exists one. Will A increase or
decrease the probability of B? Without any information,
4we have no reason to prefer one of the two answers. The
only rational answer is the one which makes no difference
– that A is irrelevant for B, that both are independent
of each other, P (A∧B) = P (A)P (B). This approach, of
course, does not prevent us from errors – we may not have
had the information required to recognize their correla-
tion. But this is not a problem for plausible reasoning:
Once the statistical data which suggest a dependence are
known, they will be applied to modify the probabilities,
in a process known as Bayesian updating. And despite
the fact that the initial conclusion about the indepen-
dence appeared to be wrong, this does not change the
point that it was the only reasonable one, given the in-
formation which was available at this time.
This difference becomes essential for the considera-
tion of superdeterminism – the question if the general
probability distribution ρ(ω) = ρ(a, λ) of (5) splits into
ρ(a)ρ(λ) of (6). This is nothing but the usual situation
– we have the decisions of the experimenters, and in gen-
eral, we have no information which would suggest that
it is somehow correlated with anything relevant for the
preparation or the execution of the experiment. And this
lack of information is already sufficient, it is all we need
in plausible reasoning to switch from (5) to (6).
Let’s note that this does not mean that superdetermin-
ism is wrong. What we consider here is logic – and noth-
ing nontrivial about reality can follow from pure logic
taken alone. And superdeterminism is, even if it is a
completely unreasonable big conspiracy theory, a phys-
ical hypothesis. But we can ignore superdeterminism.
Once we have switched to the logic of plausible reason-
ing, (6) no longer means that the physical hypothesis of
superdeterminism has been somehow falsified, but that,
given the information we actually have, it would be irra-
tional to assume that superdeterminism is true.
That means, logical independence allows us to obtain
formula (6) out of of (5) without the necessity to reject
superdeterminism – we can simply ignore it. Even if su-
perdeterminism would be true, it would remain rational
for us to use (6) instead of (5).
This completes the first part of the paper, and gives
the main result: Formula (3) appears to be a formula of
the logic of plausible reasoning. It does not require any
nontrivial physical hypothesis to justify this formula –
pure logic is sufficient.
V. QUESTIONING THE LOGIC OF PLAUSIBLE
REASONING
The most direct, straightforward possibility to preserve
Einstein causality would be to question the logic of plau-
sible reasoning. A rejection of logic sounds, of course,
problematic. But that does not mean that there is no
chance. First of all, one does not have to reject logic
completely, it could be sufficient to weaken it. Moreover,
there have been attempts, and, even if they were not re-
ally successful, they were also not completely unreason-
able. Of course, a weakening of logic cannot be rejected
in general, because we could not use logic to reject it.
All what one can reject would be particular proposals to
weaken logic, so that one could base a rejection on those
parts of logic which remain untouched. Nonetheless, to
look at the results of previous attempts to criticize logic
appears interesting, and allows us to estimate what pos-
sible future attempts can give.
A. Relevance logic
One such criticism against classical logic was “rele-
vance logic” [12]. Many philosophers, in particular Hugh
MacColl [11], have claimed that some formulas of clas-
sical logic, like p → (q → p), or ¬p → (p → q), or
(p→ q) ∨ (q → r) are counterintuitive if we interpret →
as representing the concept of implication that we have
before we learn classical logic. Relevance logicians claim
that what is unsettling about these so-called paradoxes
is that in each of them the antecedent seems irrelevant
to the consequent. This has failed, not because relevance
logic has failed to make proposals how to define impli-
cation more close to the common sense meaning of the
word, but because for all purposes where implication has
been used in logic before, it was sufficient to use the p→ q
as simply a sign for ¬(p∧¬q) without some relevance be-
yond this. So, what has changed was not classical logic,
but the interpretation of the meaning of the expression
p → q, removing “relevance” from its meaning. Given
that a relevant implication p →rel q (however defined)
also proves p → q, logic was not even weakened by this
reinterpretation.
B. Intuitionism
Another classical criticism of logic were various vari-
ants of “constructive mathematics” [5], in particular “in-
tuitionism”. They rejected existence proofs of classi-
cal mathematics which have not given explicit construc-
tions of the objects in question, and proposed different
rules of logic, especially for the meaning of “exists”, so
that “there exists” becomes close to “we can construct”.
This criticism was solved by the Go¨del-Gentzen trans-
lation [6, 7], which in particular translated a classical
“(∃x)A(x)” into “¬((∀x)¬A(x))”. As the result of this
translation, every proof valid in classical logic became a
valid proof in intuitionist logic too. So, the answer was
quite similar: the mathematical apparatus of logic re-
mained unchanged, and the criticism has only succeeded
to modify the interpretation of “exists”, distinguishing it
from “we can construct”. Similarly to the case above,
classical logic was not weakened too – an explicit con-
struction can be used to prove existence too.
So, the history of criticism of classical logic shows a
clear pattern: The mathematical apparatus of logic re-
mained unchanged. The only thing which has changed
5was the interpretation of the meaning of some math-
ematical expressions, away from the stronger common
sense meaning toward a weaker interpretation which cor-
responds to the formulas of logic. While new mathe-
matical constructions, which covered the common sense
meaning in a more accurate way, have been proposed,
they have not given much, and are now essentially aban-
doned. What has survived was the mathematical concept
as used in pure logic, and the modified, weaker interpre-
tation of the logical rule.
C. Frequentism vs. logic of plausible reasoning
The difference between the frequentist interpretation
and the Bayesian interpretation of probability theory –
the logic of plausible reasoning – can be understood along
similar lines. Jaynes [8] sees the Bayesian interpretation
in a classical tradition going back to Laplace, so that
frequentism can be seen as a criticism of this tradition
too. The key advantage of the logic of plausible reason-
ing was that it can be applied to a much wider range –
namely, it can be used to assign degrees of plausibility
to theories and hypotheses, which cannot be interpreted
as frequencies. On the other hand, similarly to the cases
above, where the frequency interpretation is applicable,
the resulting probabilities are the same.
D. Why this makes sense
In all three cases, the result can be understood as being
quite rational. Once the formulas of logic can be applied
always and everywhere, it would not be reasonable to re-
ject them. If there appears to be a contradiction between
the common sense meaning of the phrase used to describe
the logical rule and the formulas, the adequate reaction
is, first, to find a more accurate description of the log-
ical rule in common language, and, on the other hand,
to find a new formalism which adequately describes the
common sense meaning used before for the logical rule.
Then, everybody is free to use what is more important
for him. Given that the logical rule has a much wider
range of applicability – everywhere – one can reasonably
expect that the logical rule will be more widely used.
So, history and rationality seem to lead to similar con-
clusions: The formulas which are part of logic will sur-
vive. But it is possible that they have to be reinterpreted,
and this reinterpretation has to be done in a careful way.
One has to distinguish the purely logical notion – usu-
ally weak, because applicable without any restriction –
from the common sense notion, which covers usually only
archetypal applications instead of the most general one.
The archetypal, common sense applications nonetheless
remain valid applications, so that logic is not weakened
by such a reinterpretation.
E. The situation with causality
Regarding causality, the situation seems quite similar.
With (3) as a logical formula, we have a sort of weak,
purely logical notion of causal influence. It is defined by
the function o(a, λ), which always exists. This is different
from the classical, common sense meaning of causality,
which is considered to be a sort of physical hypothesis,
which is part of some theories but not of others.
The other thing we have observed in all three exam-
ples above, namely that if the stronger common sense
notion is applicable, the weaker logical one is also valid,
holds here too. In a theory with common sense causal-
ity, a dependence of the function o(a, λ) on a would be
interpreted as a causal influence.
To summarize, there is no reason to hope that ques-
tioning the logic of plausible reasoning may allow to save
Einstein causality. All one can hope for is a metaphysical
reinterpretation of the meaning of causality.
VI. THE EXAMPLE OF QUANTUM THEORY
It makes sense to consider this weaker notion of logical
causality for quantum theory. At least in the minimal in-
terpretation of quantum theory it is not a theory which
makes statements about causality at all. The de Broglie-
Bohm interpretation (which is essentially a different the-
ory, which gives the quantum predictions only in a sub-
set of quantum equilibrium states) has also been named
“causal interpretation”, with the obvious hint that all
other interpretations are not causal.
To consider the example of quantum theory is useful
also because of other counterarguments. So it has been
explicitly doubted that Kolmogorovian probability the-
ory is sufficient to handle quantum theory, for example,
by Khrennikov [9]:
Roughly speaking for any fixed experimen-
tal context a Kolmogorov space can be used.
Probabilistic data collected in a fixed ex-
periment in quantum (as well as classical)
physics can be described by the conventional
measure-theoretic model, but not data col-
lected for a few incompatible observables. [9]
p. vii
Then, the Stone space we have used here is, in a general
situation, a quite complex object. The problem is that
to construct a particular ω ∈ Ω in a situation where we
have an infinite space of propositions F would require
a similarly infinite amount of arbitrary choices. As a
consequence, to prove it we have to use the axiom of
choice2, which usually suggests that the construction is
a quite artificial one.
2 Technically, a slightly weaker assumption, the Boolean prime
ideal theorem, is sufficient, but this would not change the point.
6Fortunately, the axiom of choice is not as problematic
as it is presented in popular culture. It is known today
that this axiom does not lead to contradictions. If set
theory without it is free of contradiction, it remains free
of contradictions if we add the axiom of choice. Then,
for the interesting applications this does not matter at
all. In fact, whenever we consider a particular conceiv-
able scenario, we try to fix only the relevant properties.
This requires only a finite number of choices. And if
we later have to consider some other property, which we
have not fixed yet, we can fix it and continue. Stone’s
theorem is useful only because it gives us certainty that
even in the purely theoretical case of an infinite number
of propositions, which could force us into the necessity
of an infinite number of such choices, would not lead us
into contradictions.
Nonetheless, given the importance of quantum theory,
it seems useful to given an explicit and usable construc-
tion of this space for quantum theory.
A. Explicit construction for quantum theory
For every particular quantum observation, as defined
by an operator Fˆ , quantum theory already defines a par-
ticular Kolmogorovian space with a probability distribu-
tion on it. The space is defined by the possible measure-
ment results of the observable, say, f , together with the
quantum state ρˆ. The corresponding conceivable pos-
sibility would be the proposition “the measurement of
F for the quantum state ρˆ ∈ S would give the result
f ∈ F”. This gives us a space ΛF consisting of pairs
(ρˆ, f) ∈ S×F ∼= ΛF , with probability distribution ρ(f)df
defined by the eigenstates f ∈ F of the operator Fˆ as
〈ψf |ρˆ|ψf 〉.
Now let’s consider an arbitrary set of incompatible
measurements Fˆa, a ∈ A, and combine them into a sin-
gle big experiment, where we make some random choice
a ∈ A what to measure. For simplicity, we can restrict
ourselves to a classical random device deciding about the
a ∈ A. Let’s denote the measurement results for different
measurements as fa ∈ Fa. What defines in this case the
space Ω?
Given that it is conceivable that Fˆa is measured,
we have to include the conceivable measurement results
fa ∈ Fa for all a ∈ A. This gives us the product space
FA ∼=
∏
a∈A Fa. The prepared state ρˆ ∈ S will be part
too, which gives our resulting space Λ ∼= S × FA. The
measurement which is actually made is, of course, also
relevant, so that we obtain the space Ω ∼= A× Λ used in
(3).
Let’s define now the probability distribution on Ω.
For given (a, ρˆ), quantum theory defines the probabil-
ity distribution on the space Fa of measurement results
ρa(fa, ρˆ). On the product space, we can use
ρ(λ) = ρ(fA, ρˆ) =
∏
a∈A
ρa(fa, ρˆ) on Λ ∼=
∏
a∈A
Fa ×S, (7)
which is a probability distribution of type ρ(λ)dλ on Λ
we need. To show that this probability distribution is
viable, all one needs is that it gives, for every fixed a ∈
A, the correct distribution on the space of the actual
measurement results Fa, which is trivial by construction:
E(o|a) =
∫
o(fa)ρ(fA, ρˆ)dfA
=
∫
o(fa)ρ(fa)dfa
∏
a′ 6=a
ρa′(fa′)dfa′
=
∫
o(fa)ρ(fa)dfa.
(8)
Given that it gives the correct predictions for all ex-
periments allowed in quantum theory, there would be no
need for any further justification. If this would have been
a guess, so what? A positivist has certainly no reason to
object.
Nonetheless, this probability distribution can be de-
rived from the principles of plausible reasoning. All we
need to obtain (7) is, beyond the information provided
by quantum theory about the probability distributions
ρa(fa, ρˆ) of particular experiments, a basic principle of
plausible reasoning, the principle of logical independence:
If we have no information which indicates some depen-
dence between two variables, then we have to assume
that they are independent.
We have to apply it two times. The first time when
we have made the split ρ(ω) = ρ(a, λ) → ρ(a)ρ(λ), as-
suming the independence of the free decisions of the ex-
perimenters what to measure, as discussed above. The
second time when we have made the split of ρ(fA, ρˆ) into
the product of the ρa(fa, ρˆ) in (7). In both cases, we have,
indeed, no information provided by quantum theory that
there is a connection between the entities assumed as in-
dependent.
B. Details about causal dependencies would have
to follow from hidden variable theories
While the independence seems unproblematic for the
free will decisions, the independence assumption made in
(7) seems less plausible. Here one can reasonably expect
that the future will give us additional information which
will force us to reject the independence. What type of
information could this be? We can give here a quite
definitive answer, namely that it has to be a hidden vari-
able theory. It has to provide some information which is
not provided by quantum theory, that means, it is hid-
den information. What else is a hidden variable theory
if not a theory which provides information not available
in quantum theory?
Let’s note here that the construction (7) in itself is not
unknown. Kochen and Specker [10] have given a vari-
ant of this construction, naming it “somewhat trivial”
(which, indeed, it is) and “artificial” (it is not, but consid-
ering it as a “hidden variable theory” is indeed artificial,
7given that it does not contain any hidden information).
The purpose for giving this construction was to “to point
out the insufficiency of condition (1) [essentially our (4)]
as a test for the adequacy of the solution of the [hidden
variable] problem”. There is a reason to agree. That we
can fulfill (4) without adding any information to quan-
tum theory means that fulfilling it does not “solve” any
hidden variable problem. What it does is something dif-
ferent, namely to put an end on attacks on formula (4).
One can hardly argue that this formula is inadequate and
can no longer be applied if it can be obtained even for
quantum theory as it is, based on a trivial construction.
Kochen and Specker continued by proposing an ad-
ditional condition for what would be an adequate solu-
tion of the hidden variable problem, today named non-
contextuality, only to show that it cannot be fulfilled.
While it is certainly important to find out properties
which have to be violated by hidden variable theories,
this is not a point of interest here. Our point is the op-
posite: The probability distribution (7) may appear in-
adequate, because the independence assumption is too
strong. This happens always if we have more infor-
mation, information which indicates a dependence. No
problem – but what we can say is that another theory,
which provides such information, will be a hidden vari-
able theory in the most straightforward meaning of the
word, simply because it provides – it has to provide –
information which is hidden in quantum theory.
A more detailed consideration of the question of hid-
den variable in quantum theory shows that quantum the-
ory itself contains some elements which are not fixed by
quantum theory, but depend on choices of the theoreti-
cian who describes a particular situation. Then, if we
compare different choices of the theoretician, it appears
that one description contains information which is hidden
in the other one.
One such theoretical decision is the classical-quantum
split in the Copenhagen interpretation. Imagine one and
the same experiment with different splits between the
classical and the quantum part. Then, the description
with the larger classical part contains information about
the classical trajectory in the intermediate region, infor-
mation which is hidden if the quantum part is larger. One
split puts the mechanism which possibly kills the cat into
the quantum part, one into the classical. Then, the sec-
ond split contains the trajectory of the mechanism, which
is hidden in the other split.
Another situation where quantum theory differently
interpreted appears to be a hidden variable theory is
the possibility to describe the two measurements in Bell
tests in different ways – as a common measurement, or as
two separate experiments, with two possible orderings in
time. There exists either a dependence of A(a, b, λ) on b
or of B(a, b, λ) on a, as a consequence that Bell’s inequal-
ity is violated. But if Alice measures first, then Bob’s de-
cision what to measure cannot influence the measurement
result of Alice, so that A(a, b, λ) = A(a, λ). Similarly, if
Bob measures first, B(a, b, λ) = B(b, λ).
These considerations already provide example of useful
applications of the formalism. Once one recognizes that
the space Λ is a logical triviality, which does not indicate
any nontrivial information about hidden variables, one
can much easier identify those elements where hidden
variables appear.
VII. CONSEQUENCES: WHAT REMAINS
FROM EINSTEIN CAUSALITY?
Let’s consider now the consequences of the main re-
sult. Einstein causality – or, more accurate, any in-
terpretation of Einstein causality which requires that
A(a, b, λ), B(a, b, λ) which appear in (2) have the form
A(a, λ), B(b, λ) – is sufficient to derive the Bell inequali-
ties, and therefore has to be rejected. What could be a
replacement? One radical solution would be, in princi-
ple, to give up causality completely. But, as we will see,
there is no necessity for this.
A. Weakening Einstein causality: Signal causality
One straightforward possibility, which seems quite
popular even now, is to give up the usual, strong ver-
sion of Einstein causality, and to go back to a weaker
notion of causality – weak or signal causality. With weak
causality, it is not sufficient for a causal connection that
some function o(a, λ) depends on some variable a, but,
first, we care only about observables o(a, λ), only if they
depend on free decisions of experimenters a, and we re-
quire not only that the function o(a, λ) itself depends on
a, but if the expectation value E(o|a) =
∫
o(a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ
depends on a.
While such a restriction, with its restriction to observ-
able effects, is quite plausible from point of view of pos-
itivism, positivism is no longer a reasonable candidate
for a philosophy of science. In Popper’s critical ratio-
nalism, scientific theories are hypotheses, thus, can and
will contain hypotheses which are not immediately open
to empirical tests. They have to make testable empirical
predictions, the more the better, but if some hypothe-
sis about unobservable elements of reality leads, however
implicit, to some additional testable predictions, this is
sufficient to justify the hypothesis.
Such a weak notion of causality makes, of course, sense
as a useful information about restrictions for human de-
vices, preventing hopeless affords similar to perpetuum
mobile construction. But as some fundamental principle
it seems useless. The point is that now we know that for
every theory there will exist some description in terms
of o(a, λ) and E(o|a) =
∫
o(a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ, so that the in-
formation that E(o|a) does not depend on a either fol-
lows from o(a, λ) not depending on a, which would mean
strong causality, or it is a consequence of the impossibility
to fix in our preparations sufficiently precise distributions
8ρ(λ)dλ, thus, it would be only a side effect of restricted
human abilities with no fundamental importance.
So, even if one accepts weak causality as an interest-
ing information, one would not consider it as something
fundamental. It is derived from the fundamental, strong
notion of causality defined by the functions o(a, λ) to-
gether with restrictions of our ability to prepare initial
states.
B. Classical causality in the Lorentz ether
If one wants to preserve for a fundamental causality at
least the non-existence of causal loops (as necessary to
avoid the grandfather paradox), one has no choice but to
accept a hidden preferred frame.
Indeed, assume we can, for any pair of events, observe
violations of the Bell inequalities. Let’s fix the event
ea when Alice makes the measurement and try to iden-
tify an equal time event on Bob’s world-line eb(t). We
assume that we have moments t− long before the exper-
iment and t+ long after so that eb(t−) → ea → eb(t+).
Then all we have to do is to use Dedekind cuts to con-
struct a sequence (tn−, t
n
+) with eb(t
n
−) → ea → eb(t
n
+)
and |tn+ − t
n
−| = 2
−n|t+ − t−|. We observe a violation
of the Bell inequalities for ti+1 = 1
2
(ti+ + t
i
−). Based on
strong causality, we conclude that either ea → eb(t
i+1)
or eb(t
i+1) → ea, so that we can put t
i+1 either in
place of ti+1+ or t
i+1
− , reusing the other t
i
± as t
i+1
± . This
gives eb(t
i+1
− ) → ea → eb(t
i+1
+ ). This sequence gives a
limit t∗ with the property that for every ε > 0 we have
eb(t∗ − ε)→ ea → eb(t∗ + ε). The eb(t∗) defines the mo-
ment contemporary to ea, so that we obtain in this way
a global contemporaneity.
Given that we can only observe a violation of the Bell
inequalities, but cannot find out what was the direction
of causal influence which has caused it, the resulting pre-
ferred foliation remains hidden from observation. But is a
hidden preferred frame compatible with modern physics?
In the domain of special relativity, this would require
nothing but a return to the Lorentz interpretation, where
a preferred rest frame of the Lorentz ether exists, and rel-
ativistic effects are distortions of clocks and rulers caused
by velocity against a static homogeneous ether. A gener-
alization of the Lorentz ether into the domain of relativis-
tic gravity which gives, in a natural limit, the Einstein
equations of GR in harmonic coordinates, is also known
[14]. This generalized Lorentz ether is no longer static
and homogeneous, and its density and stress tensor also
influences clocks and rulers. There exists also a proposal
for an interpretation of the standard model of particle
physics compatible with the Lorentz ether [13]. This
model gives the SM gauge group and the three genera-
tions of fermions, together with some additional massive
scalar fields. So, compatibility of the Lorentz ether with
modern physics is unproblematic. The classical notion of
causality can also survive in quantum theory, as, for ex-
ample, in realistic and causal interpretations of quantum
theory like the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. More-
over, given that in the Lorentz ether causality is con-
nected with the fixed Newtonian background of absolute
space and time, to preserve causality during quantization
of the Lorentz ether is unproblematic too – the back-
ground remains fixed, so that causality remains fixed too,
and is not endangered by uncertainty of the metric.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that a basic formula in the proof of
Bell’s inequality, (2), is a formula following from the logic
of plausible reasoning applied to the situation of the ex-
periment considered in Bell’s paper, without any further
physical assumptions like realism or causality. As a con-
sequence, all what is necessary to prove Bell’s theorem
is Einstein causality. That means, given that the Bell
inequalities are violated for space-like separated pairs of
measurements, Einstein causality has been empirically
falsified.
None of the loopholes usually discussed – rejection of
realism and causality, or superdeterminism – are left.
The only possibility to preserve Einstein causality would
be to reject the logic of plausible reasoning. We have
considered earlier attempts to criticize classical logic, and
came to the conclusion that all one can hope for is a rein-
terpretation of the meaning of the formulas of logic, away
from the common sense meaning toward a weaker, more
general, purely logical interpretation. Such a reinterpre-
tation of the meaning of causality can be found here too.
We have illustrated this considering quantum theory,
where we have identified a rather weak notion of causal-
ity. We have found that any strengthening of this weak
notion would require some hidden variables.
Last but not least, we have considered the possibili-
ties to weaken Einstein causality. One possibility would
be a notion of weak Einstein causality based on signal
causality. Such a notion of causality cannot have any fun-
damental importance, because the impossibility to send
signals faster than light is only a consequence of uncer-
tainty relations preventing the preparation of sufficiently
certain states. If one wants to have a fundamental notion
of causality without causal loops, one has to accept the
introduction of a hidden preferred frame. Fortunately,
nothing in modern science is in conflict with such a hid-
den preferred frame, theories based on such a preferred
frame exist as for relativistic gravity as for the standard
model of particle physics.
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